Vehicle Searches: Overview

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In the early days of the automobile, the Court created an exception for searches of vehicles, holding in Carroll v. United States 1 Footnote
267 U.S. 132 (1925) . Carroll was a Prohibition-era liquor case, whereas a great number of modern automobile cases involve drugs. that vehicles may be searched without warrants if the officer undertaking the search has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The Court explained that the mobility of vehicles would allow them to be quickly moved from the jurisdiction if time were taken to obtain a warrant.2 Footnote
267 U.S. at 153 . See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) . All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) , the Court, without discussion, and over Justice Harlan’s dissent, id. at 55, 62 , extended the rule to evidentiary searches.

Initially, the Court limited Carroll ’s reach, holding impermissible the warrantless seizure of a parked automobile merely because it is movable, and indicating that vehicles may be stopped only while moving or reasonably contemporaneously with movement.3 Footnote
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) . This portion of the opinion had the adherence of a plurality only, Justice Harlan concurring on other grounds, and there being four dissenters. Id. at 493, 504, 510, 523 . The Court also ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrantless search at the convenience of the police.4 Footnote
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) ; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) .

The Court next developed a reduced privacy rationale to supplement the mobility rationale, explaining that “the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property.” 5 Footnote
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) . “One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . . It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.’” 6 Footnote
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion), quoted in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) . See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) ; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976) ; Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424–25 (1981) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982) . Although motor homes serve as residences and as repositories for personal effects, and their contents are often shielded from public view, the Court extended the automobile exception to them as well, holding that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in a mobile home parked in a parking lot and licensed for vehicular travel, hence “readily mobile.” 7 Footnote
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (leaving open the question of whether the automobile exception also applies to a “mobile” home being used as a residence and not “readily mobile” ).

The Court has stated, however, that the automobile exception “does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.” 8 Footnote
Collins v. Virginia , 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) . This limit to the exception exists because “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself.” 9 Footnote
Id. at 1671 . To search a vehicle under the automobile exception, an officer “must have a lawful right of access” to that vehicle,10 Footnote
Id. at 1672 . and generally, law enforcement officers have no right to enter a home or its curtilage without express or implied permission or without a warrant.11 Footnote
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2013) .

Although officers who have stopped a car to issue a routine traffic citation may conduct a Terry -type search, even including a pat-down of driver and passengers if there is reasonable suspicion that they are armed and dangerous, they may not conduct a full-blown search of the car23 Footnote
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (invalidating an Iowa statute permitting a full-blown search incident to a traffic citation). unless they exercise their discretion to arrest the driver instead of issuing a citation.24 Footnote
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (police officers, in their discretion, may arrest a motorist for a minor traffic offense rather than issuing a citation); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (officers who arrest an occupant of a vehicle may make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compartment, including closed containers); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (the Belton rule applies regardless of whether the arrestee exited the car at the officer's direction, or whether he did so prior to confrontation); Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (the Belton rule applies “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest” ); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (pretextual arrest of motorist who has committed a traffic offense is permissible even if purpose is to search vehicle for evidence of other crime). And once police have probable cause to believe there is contraband in a vehicle, they may remove the vehicle from the scene to the station house in order to conduct a search, without thereby being required to obtain a warrant.25 Footnote
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) . The same rule applies if it is the vehicle itself that is forfeitable contraband; police, acting without a warrant, may seize the vehicle from a public place. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) . “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.” 26 Footnote
Michigan v. Thomas , 458 U.S. at 261 . See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) ; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982) . Because of the lessened expectation of privacy, inventory searches of impounded automobiles are justifiable in order to protect public safety and the owner’s property, and any evidence of criminal activity discovered in the course of the inventories is admissible in court.27 Footnote
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) ; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) . See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) ; United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) . Police, in conducting an inventory search of a vehicle, may open closed containers in order to inventory contents. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) . The Justices were evenly divided, however, on the propriety of warrantless seizure of an arrestee’s automobile from a public parking lot several hours after his arrest, its transportation to a police impoundment lot, and the taking of tire casts and exterior paint scrapings.28 Footnote
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) . Justice Powell concurred on other grounds.

Police in undertaking a warrantless search of an automobile may not extend the search to the persons of the passengers therein29 Footnote
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) ; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94–96 (1979) . unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the passengers are armed and dangerous, in which case a Terry patdown is permissible,30 Footnote
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) . or unless there is individualized suspicion of criminal activity by the passengers.31 Footnote
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause to arrest passengers based on officers finding $783 in glove compartment and cocaine hidden beneath back seat armrest, and on driver and passengers all denying ownership of the cocaine). But because passengers in an automobile have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior area of the car, a warrantless search of the glove compartment and the spaces under the seats, which turned up evidence implicating the passengers, invaded no Fourth Amendment interest of the passengers.32 Footnote
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) . Luggage and other closed containers found in automobiles may also be subjected to warrantless searches based on probable cause, regardless of whether the luggage or containers belong to the driver or to a passenger, and regardless of whether it is the driver or a passenger who is under suspicion.33 Footnote
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) ( “police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search” ). The same rule now applies whether the police have probable cause to search only the containers34 Footnote
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) . or whether they have probable cause to search the automobile for something capable of being held in the container.35 Footnote
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) . A Ross search of a container found in an automobile need not occur soon after its seizure. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (three-day time lapse). See also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (consent to search automobile for drugs constitutes consent to open containers within the car that might contain drugs).

Footnotes 1 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . Carroll was a Prohibition-era liquor case, whereas a great number of modern automobile cases involve drugs. 2 267 U.S. at 153 . See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) . All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) , the Court, without discussion, and over Justice Harlan’s dissent, id. at 55, 62 , extended the rule to evidentiary searches. 3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) . This portion of the opinion had the adherence of a plurality only, Justice Harlan concurring on other grounds, and there being four dissenters. Id. at 493, 504, 510, 523 . 4 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) ; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) . 5 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) . 6 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion), quoted in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) . See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) ; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976) ; Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424–25 (1981) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982) . 7 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (leaving open the question of whether the automobile exception also applies to a “mobile” home being used as a residence and not “readily mobile” ). 8 Collins v. Virginia , 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) . 9 Id. at 1671 . 10 Id. at 1672 . 11 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2013) . 12 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving patrols); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) . Cf. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) . An automobile’s “ready mobility [is] an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause is clear” ; there is no need to find the presence of “unforeseen circumstances” or other additional exigency. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 527 U.S. 465 (1996) . Accord, Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per curiam). Cf. Florida v. Harris , 568 U.S. 237 (2013) . 13 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (discretionary random stops of motorists to check driver’s license and automobile registration constitute Fourth Amendment violation); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (affirming an appellate court's judgment that stopping a vehicle on a highway near an international border merely because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry was an unconstitutional search for unlawfully present aliens). But cf. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable suspicion justified stop by border agents of vehicle traveling on unpaved backroads in an apparent effort to evade a border patrol checkpoint on the highway). In Prouse , the Court cautioned that it was not precluding the states from developing methods for spot checks, such as questioning all traffic at roadblocks, that involve less intrusion or that do not involve unconstrained exercise of discretion. 440 U.S. at 663 . 14 For example, an officer who learns, through a license plate search of a vehicle, that the registered owner has a revoked license may have a reasonable suspicion to stop that vehicle if it matches the description of the registered car and if, at the time of the stop, the officer has no countervailing reason to think the driver is not the registered owner. Kansasv. Glover , 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1184, 1191 (2020) . An officer who observes a traffic violation may stop a vehicle even if his real motivation is to investigate for evidence of other crime. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) . The existence of probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred establishes the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops regardless of the actual motivation of the officers involved, and regardless of whether it is customary police practice to stop motorists for the violation observed. Similarly, pretextual arrest of a motorist who has committed a traffic offense is permissible. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam) (upholding search of the motorist’s car for a crime not related to the traffic offense). 15 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) . 16 Byrd v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523–24 (2018) . But see id. at 1529 (noting that a “car thief would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car” ). 17 Arizona v. Johnson , 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009) . 18 Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding a sobriety checkpoint at which all motorists are briefly stopped for preliminary questioning and observation for signs of intoxication). 19 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Border Patrol stop of vehicles at a permanent checkpoint designed to apprehend unlawfully present aliens). See also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004) (upholding a search at the border involving disassembly of a vehicle's fuel tank). 20 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (vehicle checkpoint set up for the “primary purpose [of] detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” (here interdicting illegal narcotics) does not fall within the highway safety or border patrol exception to the individualized suspicion requirement, and hence violates the Fourth Amendment). Edmond was distinguished in Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) , upholding use of a checkpoint to ask motorists for help in solving a recent hit-and-run accident that had resulted in death. The public interest in solving the crime was deemed “grave,” while the interference with personal liberty was deemed minimal. 21 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (holding that contraband found in the course of such a search is admissible). 22 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) . Similarly, because there is no reasonable privacy interest in the vehicle identification number, required by law to be placed on the dashboard so as to be visible through the windshield, police may reach into the passenger compartment to remove items obscuring the number and may seize items in plain view while doing so. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) . Because there also is no legitimate privacy interest in possessing contraband, and because properly conducted canine sniffs are “generally likely[] to reveal only the presence of contraband,” police may conduct a canine sniff around the perimeter of a vehicle stopped for a traffic offense so long as the stop is not prolonged beyond the time needed to process the traffic violation. Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (a canine sniff around the perimeter of a car following a routine traffic stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is justified by the traffic offense) with Rodriguez v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613, 1614–15 (2015) (finding that the stop in question had been prolonged for seven to eight minutes beyond the time needed to resolve the traffic offense in order to conduct a canine sniff). 23 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (invalidating an Iowa statute permitting a full-blown search incident to a traffic citation). 24 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (police officers, in their discretion, may arrest a motorist for a minor traffic offense rather than issuing a citation); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (officers who arrest an occupant of a vehicle may make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compartment, including closed containers); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (the Belton rule applies regardless of whether the arrestee exited the car at the officer's direction, or whether he did so prior to confrontation); Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (the Belton rule applies “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest” ); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (pretextual arrest of motorist who has committed a traffic offense is permissible even if purpose is to search vehicle for evidence of other crime). 25 Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) . The same rule applies if it is the vehicle itself that is forfeitable contraband; police, acting without a warrant, may seize the vehicle from a public place. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) . 26 Michigan v. Thomas , 458 U.S. at 261 . See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) ; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982) . 27 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) ; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) . See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) ; United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) . Police, in conducting an inventory search of a vehicle, may open closed containers in order to inventory contents. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) . 28 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) . Justice Powell concurred on other grounds. 29 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) ; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94–96 (1979) . 30 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) . 31 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause to arrest passengers based on officers finding $783 in glove compartment and cocaine hidden beneath back seat armrest, and on driver and passengers all denying ownership of the cocaine). 32 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) . 33 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) ( “police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search” ). 34 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) . 35 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) . A Ross search of a container found in an automobile need not occur soon after its seizure. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (three-day time lapse). See also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (consent to search automobile for drugs constitutes consent to open containers within the car that might contain drugs).

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